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The concept of mentalisation (Fonagy et al. 1991) has been used to describe the way in which the child’s ability to understand his own and others’ minds crucially depends on the developmental opportunity to recognize himself as represented in the mind of another. Within the context of a case presented for supervision, this paper discusses the importance of mentalisation or ‘reflective function’ in the development of the psychological self, drawing on recent attachment-related research. Peter Webber’s film ‘Girl with a Pearl Earring’ is also presented and discussed as illustration of the psychotherapeutic significance of searching for the individual’s inner psychological potential.





I am gripped at work today by a trainee’s tale of how she is working with a man suffering from acute body dysmorphic disorder. This otherwise charming, intelligent and funny individual, she tells the tutorial group, nonetheless experiences a need to stand in front of his mirror for several hours a day, trying in vain to find something – anything – acceptable about his appearance that would make it possible for him to go outside and face the world. Despite the fact that Peter’s appearance is ordinary, even good-looking, he has persisted for the last seven years in thinking that he is terrifyingly ugly, horrifically deformed, so frightening that other people will, must be, terrified of him. He adopts a variety of strange mannerisms and strategies: going out early in the morning when there are fewer people around; hiding his face behind a hood; and evading all eye contact in order to avoid being seen and noticed. Paradoxically, these strategies simply draw attention to him, thus confirming his delusion that he is an object of horror and disgust. Peter has agreed to undertake therapy with my trainee on the understanding that his childhood, which he considers to be irrelevant, will not be discussed or dissected. The only history so far revealed is his brief and dismissive description of how, from the age of three after his mother died, he was consistently criticized, ridiculed and humiliated by his widowed father who seemed unable to find anything good, admirable or worthwhile about his son.  

The group becomes animated, discussing various theoretical models and techniques to help this man. His symptoms are so disabling, and so chronic, they feel he needs immediate urgent intervention to reduce the time he spends in front of the mirror. What about simply asking Peter to cover up all the mirrors in his house? Could the therapist ask him to draw a picture of himself as a reality check? How would he regard other people behaving in the same way as he does? More importantly, how amenable to reality-based intervention is such delusional thinking? In the midst of the melee, my trainee begins to wonder about what it is exactly that her patient sees when he looks into the mirror. Slowly, and with many contributions from the rest of the group, she begins to come to the conclusion that what he sees might perhaps be reflection of how he himself has been seen, or thought of, in his life. It is no co-incidence, she realizes, that her countertransference is predominantly one of laughter and ridicule, since this is exactly how her patient feels he was treated by his father.  The group has now started to move away from the external image, from the two-dimensional surface reflection in the mirror, and to look inside: to wonder what it is about Peter’s interior life that is reflected in the mirror, and to imagine what his feelings might have been when constantly criticized, laughed at and put down as a child. The fact that he is able only to see one tiny part of his face at a time, that it is his nose, or his chin, or his eyes that constitute the intense focus of agonized self-scrutiny and criticism, may, we hypothesise, reflect his inability to see himself as an integrated whole; that unacceptable parts of himself seem to have been split off and projected onto his facial features, where they lodge, imaginary evidence, perhaps, for others to reject. 

Like Narcissus, this time in front of a distorting mirror, this man seems to be fascinated by his reflection. Instead of falling in love with an idealized image of himself as Narcissus did, however, he is horrified and appalled by the sight of  himself, and describes experiencing symptoms of acute anxiety, a sense of panic and a belief that ‘this cannot really be me’. It is as if there are feelings writ large on his face that do not appear to belong to him, that he cannot allow himself to have any connection with. No-one must be allowed to see or comment on them; as, perhaps, no-one was able to see, comment on or contain his feelings at the death of his mother. Indeed, he is now resorting to what my trainee calls ‘DIY surgery’, scraping nails across his face, destroying the evidence of those feelings, to try to rectify the situation.  

From a broadly Kleinian perspective, it might be argued that the problem for Peter is that being seen on the outside is unconsciously experienced as the same as being seen on the inside. In this psychotic seam of experience, in what Segal (1957) has termed ‘symbolic equivalence’ mode, there is a profound confusion of inner and outer, of what is real and what is fantasy; where whole persons are seen as parts and where feelings that cannot be symbolically represented in words or concepts are instead violently projected out and concretely located and experienced in objects. His lengthy, self-searching sojourns in front of the mirror are a form of ‘psychic retreat’, in Steiner’s (1993) phrase, a psychological enclave where Peter is protected from any contact with internal reality or external relationships. For Peter, it seems that being seen on the inside, that is, being known psychologically by another’s mind, may be both a longed for and feared psychic reality. Like Sartre’s voyeur at the keyhole, he is caught, trumped, humiliated by the other’s look, whose imaginary eyes he attempts to outwit with his defensive manoeuvres. Meanwhile, it is those same imaginary eyes that confront him in the mirror, where his reflection transfixes him as the physical counterpart of a psychological self he can neither bear nor avoid. 

Peter’s difficulty, quite literally, in facing himself raises the interesting question of how we come to see and appreciate ourselves in psychological terms, to understand ourselves and others from the inside, as it were. For Winnicott, to be seen is to have one’s true self noticed, admired and mirrored by the near-perfect adaptation of the mother who promotes the illusion of omnipotence in her baby. For Bollas, to be seen is to be subject to  the (m)Other’s ‘logic of relating’, that imprints the ego with the unrepresentable ‘shadow of the object’.  More generally, our ability to represent – and thereby regulate - our own mental states may be thought of as the fulcrum on which social and interpersonal behaviour depends. Peter’s blindness to his psychological self is a lacuna that paradoxically invites those of us hearing about him in the tutorial to invest him with a psychological significance, potential and complexity that he cannot yet allow for himself. 

Holding someone psychologically in mind is, perhaps, not a bad way to describe the process of therapy itself. Recently, I have been struck by Peter Webber’s film of Tracy Chevalier’s book ‘Girl with a Pearl Earring’, which is a study, among other things, of a relationship that celebrates the creative, generative aspect of seeing ‘inside’: of finding psychological potential in others. My discussion of this film is intended to form the basis for an exploration of some of the currently very rich areas of research that have attempted to examine the mechanisms and processes by which we do this, and to consider their  significance within the therapeutic relationship.
Vermeer and ‘Girl with a Pearl Earring’.

For the 17th century Dutch artist, Johannes Vermeer, seeing was commensurate with looking inside. His paintings of domestic interiors, portraying everyday household scenes of great simplicity and beauty, constantly invite us to look within, beyond the two-dimensional surface, towards the metaphorical interior of the picture. The amazing quality of colour and light in his pictures both illuminates what we can see physically and highlights what we can only see with the ‘inner eye’: those layers of possible meaning in the scene and the intention or motives of the person within it. Unusually, in Vermeer’s celebrated portrait ‘Girl With A Pearl Earring’, the focus is placed solely on the face of a young woman. Wearing a makeshift turban, a pearl dangling from her left ear, she is turning towards us, her eyes wide and softly shining, her lips wet and parted, her expression enigmatic. Who is she, and why has she been painted? Who is she looking at? More importantly, what does Vermeer see in her, and what is he trying to convey to us?  The viewer is constantly asked to look beyond the surface, beyond the static appearance of the girl on the canvas, towards the dynamic psychological reality she embodies. She fascinates us, not only as a beautiful woman, but as a signpost to interiority. 

Peter Webber’s film, based on Tracy Chevalier’s novel ‘Girl With A Pearl Earring’ plays enticingly with this theme of seeing and being seen. We meet Griet, a sensitive adolescent Protestant girl in 17th century Delft, who is torn away from her family to work as a maid in the Catholic household of Vermeer.  Leaving her mother and her blind, beloved ex-tile painter father, from whom she has inherited her interest in colour, Griet travels across town to enter another world entirely. She meets members of Vermeer’s household: Catharina, Vermeer’s tense, ever-pregnant wife; her brood of spoilt children; and Maria, Vermeer’s shrewd, penny-pinching mother-in-law, who owns the house and sees most of what goes on in it. In the midst of the family chaos, at the top of the house, is Vermeer’s studio, a sanctuary of peace and calm, where large windows let in precious light, and where no-one is allowed to enter, not even Catharina. Griet is instructed to clean the studio, to remove, change or disturb nothing within. It is clear to us that this is a space defined by and reserved for a particular kind of vision whose significance is lost on Vermeer’s family.

We quickly learn that, within the household, Vermeer’s pictures are treated as a means to an end. ‘They’re only paintings, paintings for money, they mean nothing’ says Maria, who entertains and flatters Vermeer’s rapacious, sensual patron, Van Ruiyven, thus trying to ensure a continued income for them all. But Griet silently sees far more than the extrinsic value of art. She notices the significance of light (should she clean the windows, which would alter the quality of light in the room?); she observes the exact position of a chair in the background. She appreciates that these things matter in the overall design and composition of a picture: they have artistic and emotional, rather than merely financial potential. Vermeer himself soon realizes Griet’s sensitivity to light and colour and invites her to come and secretly work for him in the studio, mixing colours. He introduces her to his own version of reality, via the camera lucida, a lens through which, like his art, external reality is transformed. It is this capacity for and sensitivity to the potential for transformation that Griet shares with Vermeer, and which Catharina is so signally unable to appreciate: a  form of metaphorical blindness that bars her from the studio.

The entirely unspoken psychological affinity between Vermeer and Griet grows in tandem with Van Ruiyven’s increasing obsession with Griet’s physical, surface charms. After Griet narrowly avoids being raped by Van Ruiyven, he demands that Vermeer paint him a portrait of Griet for his house: if he can’t have her physically, he will at least own her likeness. The contract is arranged with the covert agreement of Maria, on the understanding that her daughter Catharina does not know of such an inappropriate arrangement. Meanwhile, Catharina’s baffled jealousy of Griet’s psychological closeness to Vermeer is matched by Griet’s own intense jealousy of Catharina’s sexual closeness to the same man. Catharina’s continuous state of pregnancy – her physical interior - signifies a sexual relationship that confirms her unhappy position as desired but unloved wife. It is Griet’s psychological interior, which we as viewers must constantly infer and interpret, that affirms for us her status as beloved in Vermeer’s eyes.
For the portrait, Griet is to wear one of Catharina’s pearl earrings, secretly donated by Maria who grimly recognizes the potential of Griet’s financial significance to the family. As a metaphor, of course, the pearl conveys wealth and position. Worn by Griet, however, the pearl more tellingly looks past the implied financial status and points to what, with the inward eye, we should be looking at: the psychological potential within. When Vermeer finally paints Griet, it is this potential, the silent, erotic, unconsummated bond between them that is brought into sharp focus.  Until now, we as viewers have questioned the exact nature of the relationship; ( ‘is it real,’ as Freddy Mercury sings, ‘or is it just fantasy?’).  Is it in Griet’s mind, or does Vermeer truly desire her? The fascination for viewers at this point is that Griet’s sexual awakening and hunger for Vermeer – a painful reality for her – is consistently met, appreciated and transmuted by Vermeer into artistic expression, into fantasy. When Vermeer tenderly poses Griet, the imagery used is entirely sexual: she is asked to widen her eyes; open her mouth; wet her lips. When he pierces her ear with a needle in preparation for the earring to come, Griet’s pain and delight are both palpable. When she finally sees the finished picture, she feels satisfied, known, penetrated: ‘you’ve seen inside me!’ she cries. Unlike the clumsy sexual advances of her butcher boyfriend in the external world, and the crude sexuality of Van Ruiyven, here, in the transforming light of Vermeer’s studio, the sexuality is purely symbolic, never physically realized or verbalized. Just as the needle penetrates Griet’s ear, so in the studio art, or fantasy, penetrates and infuses reality:  the symbolic interrelationship between the two is utterly creative and erotic. It is for fostering and maintaining this relationship, for what we might call this ‘creative apperception’, that Vermeer’s studio has been so carefully protected from the outside world. 

But Catharina eventually realizes that something is afoot in the studio. Rushing upstairs, she catches Vermeer and Griet in metaphorical flagrante. Her raging jealousy now comes pouring out: Griet is an ignorant maid; she cannot even read; what can her husband possibly see in her? In agonized tones, she asks why her husband has never yet painted her and insists on seeing the covered portrait of Griet in the corner. Her horrified and disgusted exclamation – ‘it’s obscene!’ – at once confirms her psychological blindness as well as her characteristically concrete understanding of the implicit eroticism in Vermeer’s vision. We are not surprised that Vermeer cannot paint Catharina: unlike Griet, there is nothing inside to see.

Griet leaves the household without a word and returns to life and marriage in the outside world. The film draws a beautiful parallel between art and life, where Griet herself is the work of art that needs a good pair of eyes – a mind - to see, understand and appreciate the picture, to bring it alive. In the experience of her relationship with Vermeer, in being seen, she has acquired and developed psychological depth and complexity, she has become a person. 

I want to suggest that Griet and my trainee’s patient Peter have something in common: both have been, to varying degrees, subject to the other’s look, the look that sees inside. For Peter, this has been crippling, paralyzing, destructive; he cannot work, sustain relationships, and can barely leave his own home. For Griet though, being seen has been creative, nurturing, generative;  she is able to leave Vermeer’s house, make her own life and marriage and to think about and understand what has happened to her. And so I want to think of how this distinction – and these consequences - might come about; of the way in which developmentally we learn to see ‘inside’ each others’ minds. I will also attempt to develop some ideas about the therapeutic significance of holding the other’s psychological potential ‘in mind’.
Theory of mind: attachment, intersubjectivity and the psychological self. 

How then do we come to learn that other people have minds? The Cartesian assumption that knowledge of the self is the precursor to knowledge of the other has traditionally left us with a philosophical dilemma about how we come to know about other peoples’ minds. If we are indeed cut off from the material world, if two minds are ‘windowless monads’, to use Leibniz’s phrase, then how are we able to gain access to eachother? As  Merleau-Ponty (1962) suggests: ‘The psyche of another appears radically inaccessible, at least in its existence. I cannot reach other lives, other thought processes, since by hypothesis, they are only open to inspection by a single individual: the one who owns them’ ( 1962, p.114). 

We are by now accustomed to the seismic shift in thinking, initiated by 19th century Darwinian influence, whereby the hegemony of this ‘one-person’  psychological model increasingly gave way to exploring the  interdependence and reciprocal influence of the subject and its environment. From a psychoanalytic perspective, Winnicott (1959) famously said ‘there is no such thing as a baby’(p.54), pointing out that even before object relationships, the unit is the  environment-individual set-up, dependent on sensitive maternal care, holding and physical management. It is within the psycho-physiological crucible of this first attachment relationship that we begin to develop an understanding of our own and others’ minds. 

How does this come about? In what has become known as ‘theory’ theory of mind approaches, the developing child arrives at an intentional theory of mind on the logical basis of observing what people do and deducing why they do it ( eg. Gopnik 1996 ).  From another perspective, known as the ‘simulation’ theory of mind approach, the child puts himself in the position of others and infers mental operations and intentional states on the basis of how he might himself feel and think ( eg. Harris 1992). In contrast to these rather cognitive, intellectually-bound accounts of the acquisition of mind, the phenomenological philosophical position suggests that understanding of the self begins in a relationship with the other: that bodily engagement is the vehicle through which we acquire and develop a sense of subjectivity. For Merleau-Ponty, (1962), the infant who is constituted by his orientation to the other from the start, actually ‘lives’ in the facial and bodily gestures of the other.  It is through this that he comes to understand the meaning of his own feelings, experiences and behaviours. 

The idea that our understanding of mind crucially depends on the body is, of course, not new: ‘the ego’ said Freud over a century ago, ‘is first and foremost a bodily ego’. Recent research is starting to elucidate both the neurobiological mechanisms  and the psychological processes through which this may occur. Studies by Gallese et al (1996) and Rizzolatti et al (1996) confirm the presence of ‘mirror’ neurons within the parieto-premotor circuits of monkeys’ brains, that become active both when the animal performs a particular action and while watching another carrying out the same behaviour: there is also evidence that the affect accompanying the action is similarly evoked in the watcher.  In other words, it seems as if the actions and feelings of others may be ‘captured’ by us at a neurobiological level providing us with the basis for intersubjective experiencing and understanding: for empathy. In parallel with Winnicott’s description of the ‘good-enough’ mother, who mirrors her infant’s feeling state  in her smile and expression, we are now beginning to understand exactly how the infant is able to find his ‘real self’ reflected in the caregiver’s expressions and actions. It is this immediate, emotional, interpersonal understanding, what Stern (1985) might call the nature of ‘affective attunement’, which is the precursor to cognitive, intellectual and linguistic development, and that is the bedrock underpinning the infant’s intersubjective experience of self. 

 From another perspective, Fonagy et al’s (1995) theory of ‘mentalisation’ helps us to flesh this out further, by suggesting that the child’s ability to understand others’ minds crucially depends on the developmental opportunity to recognize himself as represented in the mind of another. In other words, it is the parent or caregiver’s ability consistently to make sense of and reflect the infant’s early intentions and internal feeling states that gradually confers psychological status on the baby. This gradual internalization of a sense of psychological self, of the self as an ‘intentional being’ (Dennett 1987), motivated by beliefs, desires and other mental states, and, by extension, our ability to see others in the same way, is developed by and within a close attachment relationship where we have been seen in the same way.

Linked closely to the infant’s developing ‘theory of mind’ is the Bionian concept of containment, where the mother or caregiver’s job is to contain, digest and make sense of her baby’s projection of unmanageable feeling states. Fonagy et al. (1995b) found that emotional distress in infants is soothed via the mother’s mirroring of the affective state coupled with an incompatible affect, demonstrating her ability to modify, manage and cope with the distress. This in turn provides the infant with a second-order representation of experience that eventually enables the child to develop the symbolic resources by which he can reflect on and manage his own feelings. Where maternal mirroring is characterised by over-accurate and therefore overwhelming reflection of the infant’s feelings, or where it is non-existent, so that the infant’s experience remains unacknowledged, the infant in both cases fails successfully to find a representation of his self-experience in the mind of the other. Over time, and with the accumulation of such experiences, the development of a secure sense of self may be compromised. 

The infant who does find a recognizable version of himself in the other responds with joy. Joyful interaction – playfulness and creativity – drives and characterises the whole developmental process (Sroufe 1997) as the infant finds himself extended and developed by the sensitive mirroring, imitation and elaboration of his emotional experience. In these micro-interactions, which Stern (1998) has conceptualized as highly synchronized ‘steps in the dance’, dependent on sensitive timing and sequence, the infant is constantly recognizing and finding new aspects of himself. Feelings, behaviours and experiences are given shape, meaning and representation, eventually coalescing into an organized construct of the self; a working model of ‘self-with-other’, a co-created version of the self. Such ‘implicit relational knowing’ precedes and underpins conscious cognitive processes.

Research from attachment theorists and developmentalists have continued to address how the child’s early intersubjective  experience links with the ability to understand mental states in the self and others. We already know from work by Main, Kaplan and Cassidy (1985) on the Adult Attachment Interview, (George, Kaplan and Main, 1984, 1985, 1996), assessing current states of mind by adults regarding their childhood attachment experiences, that coherence of a mother’s attachment narrative is closely related to her child’s behaviour patterns and attachment status in the ‘strange situation’ experimental procedure (Ainsworth et al. 1978). Of significance, too, are those studies that have shown that young children who are securely attached are more likely to pass tests of understanding affective states in others than those who are insecurely attached (Fonagy et al. 1997). This capacity, in turn, has been clearly linked to the previously mentioned parental ability to reflect coherently on their own past: those mothers and fathers who show a high level of ‘reflective-self function’ in their attachment narratives before the birth of their baby – ie those parents whose attachment narratives show an ability to reflect on relationships in mental state terms - are 3-4 times more likely to have a securely attached baby at 1 year than those whose reflective capacity is low. (Fonagy et al.1991).

Peter: a sense of self?

It is becoming clearer, then, that the basis for a psychological sense of self and others is generated and transmitted via a close attachment relationship in which the infant is first seen, reflected and treated as a psychological being by another. Finding the psychological self in the other’s mind is then first and foremost and emotional quest, and one that is indexed by the nature of the relationship between infant and caregiver. 

Of what relevance, then, is this for my trainee’s patient, Peter? The little we know of Peter gives us several important clues about his history. His rather dismissive rejection of –indeed his emphatic veto on - discussing the potential importance of his family experiences, particularly the early loss of his mother and its impact on his life, is suggestive of an attachment history in which such issues were not, or could not be thought about or processed ( Holmes 2001).  Indeed, the possibility of emotional neglect or abuse in his family means that the very mechanism by which he might be able to reflect on such feelings may have been severely compromised. 

Winnicott (1967) has pointed out that, where a child fails to find his emotional state reflected in his mother’s face or mind, that child is likely to internalise the mother’s own mood instead. Over time, this repeated internalisation of the other’s mood or defences may come to form the basis of the child’s false- self structure. Fonagy (1997) has taken this idea further, by suggesting this ‘alien’ self may be experienced by the child as a potentially persecutory object. Such an ‘alien’ self-object ensures that the child cannot develop a secure, autonomous self-identity since he has introjected the distorted representation of the other’s version of the self: a version which cannot flexibly respond to and accurately reflect back the child’s varying emotional states and feelings. It is this distorted version of the self that now becomes assimilated as an inextricable but disturbing part of the child’s self-structure, from which the child eventually seeks to rid himself.

Whilst the theory above was originally proposed in the context of understanding borderline personality disorder, I also find it compelling in trying to understand Peter. Is it not possible that Peter’s increasingly vicious attempts to rid himself, surgically, of the features he considers so ugly, are a manifestation of exactly this process? This alien representation of himself – the introjection of his father’s view of him as an ugly, ridiculous nuisance – now unconsciously pervades his self-structure; it is so firmly entrenched that the more he attempts to establish a sense of himself (by spending increasingly long hours in front of his reflection in the mirror), the closer and more inevitably he moves towards this alien object – which, by now, actually is himself. It is an insoluble and agonising dilemma. Within this framework, Peter’s botched surgical attempts to cut off, or alter aspects of his features may represent the physical enactment of a desperate psychological attempt unconsciously to separate himself from a punitive internalised self-object. More fundamentally, drawing on Bion (1962), such attempts may signal the use of concrete enactment on the body as the only possible means of representing raw, unmodified feelings and unprocessed psychological states. Bion further suggests that in such circumstances, the individual is likely to resort increasingly to the use of projective identification, as an unconscious means of getting rid of unwanted, intolerable feeling states. 

It is a useful discipline to consider what the above theory might mean in terms of therapeutic work for Peter. If the very psychological mechanism for representing his own feelings is compromised, I would argue that it is only by reliably maintaining a space in which the potential for feelings can be firstly imagined, allowed for, actualised and only later transcribed into consciousness, that a therapist might help Peter begin to build up his self-structure. Within the theoretical framework above, I would argue that re-establishing a ‘thinking space’, and adopting what Fonagy terms a ‘mentalistic stance’ in which projected feelings can be contained and allowed for, may allow Peter to build up a sense of self in which his own, rather than another’s feeling states can be tolerated and acknowledged. More, developing the ability to reflect on his own and others’ thoughts, reasons and feelings would go some way towards protecting Peter from the devastating internal emotional impact of his constantly malign interpretation of others’ behaviour. It is interesting that, in the tutorial, we have already sampled the psychic currency of ridicule and humiliation that circulates around Peter; a countertransference that is, perhaps, ultimately indicative of something simply not being taken seriously. Indeed, it is exactly this tendency to undermine the very existence, significance and strength of Peter’s mental states that I am suggesting is at the root of his symptoms and of his psychological distress. 

Within the crucible of the therapeutic attachment relationship, it may be possible to undo Peter’s ‘alien self’ by building on and sustaining a mentalistic stance in which Peter’s emotional relationship with (reflecting on) himself and others can be renegotiated and, to some extent at least, re-established. This, of course, is not at all the same thing as aiming to promote conscious insight. Insight, or introspection, may be thought of as the conscious by-product of reflective function, which itself operates outside awareness and is automatically and unconsciously evoked within specific interpersonal contexts. However, the nature of its unconscious impact on self-other representations may be of a different order to the transference-countertransference paradigm with which many psychoanalytic practitioners are familiar. I hope I am not splitting hairs when I suggest that, with some patients, we as therapists may be involved in a far more basic level of work in which the patient’s ‘mentalising’ stance - his assumption that himself and others, including the therapist, even have feelings, beliefs, desires that can be known, thought about and tolerated - cannot always be taken for granted. In such a case, we are surely intimately involved in the co-creation of a psychological self first and foremost. The main bulk of traditional psychoanalytic interpretive work, I would suggest, comes later.

Girl with a Pearl Earring revisited

‘When indifferent’ says Chazal, ‘the eye takes still photographs; when interested, movies’. One of the fascinations of ‘Girl with a Pearl Earring’ is that in this almost silent and deceptively slow-moving film, we are constantly invited – almost forced - to infer the players’ feelings, desires and thoughts: we find ourselves using the very psychological capacity that is so patently at issue within the film. Just as Vermeer’s camera lucida projects a reflected image onto the artist’s paper or canvas, so the film projector offers us the reflection of an image on a screen: in both cases, it is the creative potential of the inward eye that is being explored within the ‘picture’ and that is revealed within ourselves as viewers. Vermeer is able to treat Griet as a psychological being, rather than as a servant girl whose job it is to simply do things. In contrast to Peter, who, we may hypothesise, has been treated, and treats himself as a physical object, Vermeer has seen, brought out, allowed for and valued Griet’s interiority. In painting her portrait, he has, within their intensely emotional relationship, reflected back her feelings to her in a way that recognizes and ultimately transforms her, that brings her alive. Despite losing Vermeer, Griet is, in the end, able to make her own independent life and marriage; she can understand and reflect on what has happened to her.

Perhaps this can be taken as a blue-print for the psychodynamic therapist?  Whilst it is certainly true that all forms of therapy implicitly foster a reflective stance in the patient, it is in psychodynamic work that the emotional significance of the patient’s psychological states can be most fully understood, experienced and transformed within the framework of a close therapeutic attachment relationship. What may be critical here, of course, is a highly developed ‘mentalising’ ability in the therapist, for it is this psychological capacity, so apparent in Vermeer, that I suggest may be the ‘engine’ responsible for promoting growth and development.  Mander (2004) has recently suggested that ‘natural counsellors’ and those ‘born with the capacity for communication, with an empathic perception of intra-psychic processes, a good ability for constructing narratives and the capacity to slip into the skin of others’ (p.167, italics mine). Similarly, Phillips (2002) quotes Winnicott: ‘a sign of health in the mind is the ability of one individual to enter imaginatively and accurately into the thoughts and feelings and hopes and fears of another person; also to allow the other person to do the same to us’ (p.29). The research evidence for reflective function strongly suggests that, whilst this is indeed a potential we are all born with, it is a psychological mechanism that is entirely dependent on an early, intimate interpersonal context for its full flowering. 





Let us return to my trainee. After some weeks, she comes to the tutorial group in a state of agitation. She tells us she has just had a session with Peter where she felt dreadfully at a loss. Looking at her directly in the face for the first time, he asks her: ‘do you think I’m ugly?’.  She says that nothing in her training so far has prepared her for this, and goes on to describe her feelings of utter confusion, embarrassment and uncertainty as she struggles to find the ‘correct’ answer. The group helpfully weighs in with various possible suggestions: perhaps he is developing an erotic attachment to her? is he simply trying to catch her out?  even if she said ‘no’, would he believe her anyway? Intrigued, I finally ask her what she thinks he wanted to hear. Rather thoughtfully, she answers: ‘what I really think of him of course! But of course I can’t tell him that because he’s frightened of what I think’.

Peter may well be terrified of what his therapist thinks of him. It is this fear, unconsciously derived from an early traumatic relationship, that seems to pull him back and maintain the deadlock of his symptoms and his situation. But, more importantly perhaps, his question shows that he is, at last, beginning to allow for the possibility of an image – possibly a less alien image - of himself in his therapist’s mind, and to want to explore this. My hunch, which I tentatively discuss with my trainee, is that it could be important for her to recognize and acknowledge this in some way before making any attempts at interpretation. It may be that it is simply in conveying her understanding of this very basic human requirement – of the need to be held psychologically in mind – that Peter can begin to find a more secure sense of self.
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